Federal Funds To Religious Groups: Where Are The First Amendment Boundaries? by Devins, Neal
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans
1988
Federal Funds To Religious Groups: Where Are
The First Amendment Boundaries?
Neal Devins
William & Mary Law School, nedevi@wm.edu
Copyright c 1988 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs
Repository Citation
Devins, Neal, "Federal Funds To Religious Groups: Where Are The First Amendment Boundaries?" (1988). Faculty Publications. 419.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/419
FIRST AMENDMENT 
Federal Funds To Religious Groups: 
Where Are The First Amendment Boundaries? 
By Neal Devins 
Otis R. Bowen 
v. 
Chan Kendrick 
(Docket Nos. 87·253, 87·431,87462 and 87·775) 
Argued March 30, 1988 
Bowen v. Kendrick promises to be one of this tenn's most 
controversial decisions. The conjunction of church state 
concerns and governmental efforts to Influence adolescent 
sexual relations Is explosive. The Court has previously con· 
sldered the constitutionality of religious groups' support of 
Congress' decision to deny federal funding of abortion 
(Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980)), upholding the 
constitutionality of the Hyde antiabortion amendment. How· 
ever, It has never considered the propriety of church-affillat· 
ed organizations utJllzing federal funds In discouraging 
abortions through counseling against premarital sexual rela· 
tlons as well as advising pregnant minors of adoption and 
referral services. Here, the Court will consider this highly 
emotional issue. 
ISSUE 
In this case, the Supreme Court will tackle the vexing 
issue of federal government assistance to religious social 
service organizations. Specifically, the Court will detennlne 
whether the Adolescent Family Ufe Act, which authorizes 
federal funding to religious organizations to conduct pro· 
grams on adolescent sexuality Issue::, violates the Establish· 
ment Clause of the First Amendment. 
FACI'S 
Congress passed the Adolescent Family Life Act ( 42 
U.S.C. section 3000 In 1981to replace the Adolescent Health 
Services and Pregnancy Care Act of 1978. The purpose of this 
Act Is to prevent adolescent pregnancy. To achieve this end, 
the Act authorizes federal funds be granted to organizations 
to conduct care and prevention service programs. To rectify 
the lack of values taught In Title VI programs, Congress 
chose to Include religious organizations In programs under 
the Act. Specifically, the Act requires applicants to describe 
how they will Involve religious organizations in their pro· 
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grams and limits funding to programs which do not provide 
abortions or abortion services. 
An actlon seeking declaratory and Injunctive relief was 
filed on October 26, 1983 In the United States District Court 
for the District of Columbia by several individuals Including 
federal taxpayers, four Protestant ministers and the American 
jewish Congress. They challenged the Act on the ground 
that It violated the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment. 
The district court found that the Adolescent Family Ufe 
Act violates the Establishment Clause both on Its face and as 
applied. The district court also concluded that portions of 
the Act Involving religious organizations were severable 
from the Act as a whole (657 E. Supp. 1547 (1987)). In 
reaching this conclusion, the court applied the three· part test 
set forth In Lemon v. Kurtzman (403 U.S. 602 (1971)). 
Under this test, a court must detennlne whether the legisla· 
tlon: has a valid secular purpose; it does not have the primary 
effect of advancing religion; and It does not cause excessive 
entanglements between the government and religion. Fail· 
ure to meet any part of this tripartite test renders the legisla· 
tion Invalid. The district court found that the Act had the 
valid secular purpose of attempting to prevent teenage 
pregnancy, but failed the "primary effect" and "excessive 
entanglement" prongs of the test. 
The district court found that the Act had the primary effect 
of advancing religion, In part, because It feared that one· tO· 
one counseling might be a mechanism for religious teach· 
ing. In particular, the district court was concerned that 
adolescents suffering from the stress of pregnancy would be 
especially vulnerable and susceptible to rellgious indoctrina· 
tlon. The court concluded that the Act presents Issues 
analogous to state aid to elementary and seconduy parochial 
schools. In these cases, the Supreme Court-claiming that 
such schools are "pervasively religious"-has been reluctant 
to validate governmental assistance programs. 
The Act was also found to have violated the "excessive 
entanglement" prong of the Lemon test. The district court 
concluded that-since the counseling services carried an 
Inherent risk that religion would be promoted-extensive 
and continuous monitoring by government would be re· 
qulred to ensure against such promot10n. The government-
claiming that grantee religious organizations are not per· 
vasivel}' sectarian-argues that this case does not raise "ex· 
cesslve entanglement" concerns. 
Finally, the district court found that the portions of the Act 
Involving religious organizations were severable from the 
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rest of the Act. The court therefore enjoined all funding of 
religious organizations under the Adolescent Family Ufe Act. 
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the taxpayers argue that 
It Is lmpennlsslble for Congress to propagate religion as It 
does in the Act. Specifically, they contend that the counsel-
ing services provided in Act programs are not neutral social 
services-arguing that It Is virtually Impossible to separate 
secular from religious values when counseling on matters 
central to religious beliefs. Finally, the taxpayers, noting that 
the Act's goals are more consistent with some religious 
beliefs than others....-contend that It Is Impermissible to use 
federal funding to favor one set of religious beliefs over 
another. 
The United States, on the other hand, argues that It is 
permissible to legislate religious values and provide funding 
for religious organizations if they are performing neutral 
social services. The government further claims that the Act is 
part of such a program both because counseling services are 
secular and because its grantees are Informed that federal 
funds may not be used to Inculcate religion. Finally, the 
government contends that the Establishment Clause does 
not prohibit neutral federal legislation from disproportion· 
ately benefiting certain religious organizations. 
The United States argues that the Act's programs are 
analogous to government aid to religiously affiliated hospl· 
tals (where the Court nearly a century ago upheld such 
programs) because neutral social services are at issue. In 
making this argument, the United States emphasizes that 
religious organizations are particularly equipped to promote 
neutral social services; since over time they have developed 
extensive mechanisms for delivering social services to the 
community, such as adoption services and homeless shel-
ters. The government therefore urges that counselors in the 
programs Involved here could effectively set aside their 
religious beliefs and Impart secular values to their clients. 
Bowen v. Kendrick stands at the crossroads of two politi-
cally irreconcilable doctrines. At one end, Roe v. Wade and 
its progeny hold Inviolable a pregnant woman's choice 
(Including that of mature minors) to have an abortion. At the 
other end, Harris v. McRae holds that the government Is not 
obligated to fund the exercise of that choice. The case now 
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before the Court asks whether church social services can 
serve as a governmentally sponsored wedge between the two 
leanings. 
If the Court here strikes down the Act, the case could 
severely limit cooperative efforts between government and 
religion In other areas. As noted In the government's brief, 
religious organizations have participated In a variety of gov· 
ernmental-funded programs Including hospitals, soup kltch· 
ens, drug abuse programs, orphanages, emergency shelters, 
Head Start and mental health programs. The invalidation of 
the Act would certainly portend problems for church·affiliat· 
ed social services which Involve counseling. On the other 
hand, If the Act Is validated, It Is likely that religious organfza. 
tlons will seek greater governmental assistance for their 
social service programs. 
ARGUMENTS 
For Chan Kendrldl (Counsel of Record, Bruce Ennis, 1200 
17/h Streel, NW, Washington, DC 20036; telephone (202) 
775·8100) 
1. The Act violates the effects and entanglement prongs of 
the Lemon test. 
2. The Act's provisions concerning religious organizations 
cannot be severed from the entire Act. Therefore, the 
entire statute must fall. 
For Otis R. Bowen, Secretary of Heallb and Hunum 
Services (Cormse4 Charles Fried, Department of justice, 
Washington, DC 20530; telephone (202) 633·2217) 
1. The Act does not violate the Establishment Clause since it 
has a secular legislative purpose, does not advance or 
Inhibit religion and does not foster excessive entangle· 
mentwith religion. 
AMICUS BRIEFS 
In Support of Chan Kendrldl 
Planned Parenthood; American Psychological Associa· 
tion; NOW; the American Jewish Committee 
In Support of Oils R. Bowen 
The U.S. catholic Conference; the Catholic League for 
Religious and Civil Rights; United Families of America 
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